仅欧洲替代方案 Alibaba Cloud.

Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) is the largest cloud provider in Asia and the third-largest globally. Alibaba Group Holding Limited is incorporated in the Cayman Islands but operationally and effectively controlled from China. The PRC National Intelligence Law (2017) Article 7 obliges Chinese organisations to "support, assist and cooperate with state intelligence work" - which is the Chinese equivalent of the US CLOUD Act and arguably broader. The Frankfurt and London regions of Alibaba Cloud are EU-located but PRC-controlled. For EU buyers needing Schrems II-style sovereignty, Alibaba Cloud raises a third-country exposure that is legally even less defensible than US providers.

China (PRC) 仅限 EU 的替代技术栈 12 已梳理的服务
预约通话 先扫描您的域
供应商
Alibaba Cloud
总部
Hangzhou, CN
司法管辖区
China (PRC)
法律制度
PRC Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, National Intelligence Law (Art. 7)

"欧盟区域"不等于主权。四个问题决定一切。

数据驻留告诉你数据存放在哪里。主权则告诉你哪个法律体系可以强制访问。这四点的答案必须都成立 - 否则该技术栈就不具备主权性。

驻留

数据物理存储在哪里?

不只是笼统的“在云端” - 而是具体在哪个数据中心、哪个国家、受哪种司法管辖。

次级处理者

您的数据路径中还有谁?

每一个接触数据的供应商:CDN、邮件中继、错误追踪、分析管道。

司法管辖区

哪些法律可以强制披露?

总部位于美国的提供商受 FISA 702 和 CLOUD Act 管辖 - 即使数据存放在法兰克福也不例外。

密钥托管

谁实际持有加密密钥?

如果云服务商同时持有数据和密钥，无论签订何种 DPA，数据对其而言都是可读的。

失败 AWS · Azure · GCP · EU 区域

在司法管辖权和密钥托管上失败。

欧盟数据、美国母公司、默认路径中的美国次级处理者、供应商管理的密钥。

通过 Binadit 托管技术栈

四项全部通过。

托管在欧盟、由欧盟总部基础设施提供。默认路径中零美国次级处理者。客户持有或欧盟 KMS 密钥。在您的第 28 条 DPA 中按名称列出。

为什么团队正在退出 Alibaba Cloud

Alibaba Cloud usage in EU mid-market is concentrated in specific patterns: cross-border e-commerce serving Chinese consumers, EU subsidiaries of Chinese parent companies, or companies that adopted Aliyun for genuinely China-specific compute and now find the EU side under regulatory pressure. The triggers we see for migration: EU customers (B2B) refusing data processing through Aliyun, NIS2 essential-entity classification flagging PRC providers as supply-chain risk, or board-level concern after the 2024 EU regulatory tightening on Chinese cloud and AI providers. The EU sovereign stack handles the EU-side workloads cleanly; China-specific workloads remain on a documented hybrid where appropriate.

Alibaba Cloud 服务及其仅欧盟等效方案

迁移不是"换一个盒子"。下面的映射是我们为离开以下平台的客户运行的 Alibaba Cloud 基于 Schrems II 的考量 - 完全适用欧盟司法管辖，数据链路中不涉及美国母公司。

Elastic Compute Service (ECS)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。基于 Debian 或 Ubuntu 的 KVM 虚拟机，使用 Terraform 供给资源，通过 Ansible 配置。
工程说明
标准虚拟机迁移。将镜像从 CentOS/Aliyun Linux 重建为 Rocky/Alma/Debian。大多数应用技术栈可无需改动直接迁移。

Object Storage Service (OSS)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。MinIO 或 Ceph RGW，兼容 S3。
工程说明
OSS 支持兼容 S3 的 API；迁移只需配置端点并同步数据。

ApsaraDB RDS

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。PostgreSQL 或 MySQL 配合 Patroni 实现故障转移，pgBackRest 实现时间点恢复。
工程说明
RDS 底层使用 MySQL/PostgreSQL/SQL Server；可根据数据规模选择逻辑复制或导出/恢复方式进行迁移。

Container Service for Kubernetes (ACK)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。基于 Debian 或 Talos 的 Kubernetes，使用 Cilium 网络方案，并通过 cert-manager 管理证书。
工程说明
ACK 是带有 Aliyun 特定插件的上游 Kubernetes；标准的 nginx-ingress 和 cert-manager 可替代 ACK 专有的对应组件。

Function Compute (FaaS)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。在您的 Kubernetes 集群上运行 Knative 或 OpenFaaS。
工程说明
函数迁移是机械化的过程；运行时模型可以顺利迁移。

Server Load Balancer (SLB)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。HAProxy 或 Nginx，配合 keepalived 实现故障转移。
工程说明
所有欧盟方案均提供标准 L4/L7 负载均衡。

Anti-DDoS Pro

我们改用什么
Binadit Private Infrastructure。上游流量过滤，在应用边缘配合限速与 CrowdSec。
工程说明
流量型攻击在到达您的服务器之前就会被上游吸收。应用层滥用行为则在能够真正被理解的地方处理，即紧邻您的流量之处。

Web Application Firewall

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。Coraza 或 ModSecurity 配合 OWASP Core Rule Set，并使用 CrowdSec 进行行为拦截。
工程说明
规则集可以直接迁移；OWASP Top 10 覆盖在各处都是标配。

CDN

我们改用什么
我们为您部署并运维欧盟 CDN：Bunny.net 或 KeyCDN，并在源站使用 Nginx 和 Varnish 进行缓存。
工程说明
CDN 是我们少数不自行运行的层级之一。我们会选定 EU 提供商，配置缓存头、清除策略和源站防护，并将其作为托管服务的一部分进行运维。

Alibaba Cloud DNS

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。PowerDNS 或 Knot，权威 DNS，经 DNSSEC 签名。
工程说明
标准区域迁移。

Tablestore (NoSQL)

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。MongoDB 副本集，或在文档模型并不复杂的场景下使用带 JSONB 的 PostgreSQL。
工程说明
对于宽列（wide-column）工作负载，ScyllaDB 是现代开源方案的代表。

PolarDB

我们改用什么
Binadit 托管云平台。由 Patroni 管理跨节点的 PostgreSQL 故障转移，支持自动提升。
工程说明
PolarDB 兼容 MySQL/PostgreSQL；可通过逻辑复制完成迁移。

我们如何迁移离开 Alibaba Cloud

典型的中端市场迁移分为三个阶段进行。以下数据假设工程团队规模为 6-10 人，应用程序技术栈复杂度中等。

  1. Weeks 1-3

    Audit + traffic-region split

    Inventory Aliyun services and classify by traffic region: serving Chinese mainland users (may stay on Aliyun, document exposure for EU data), serving EU users (priority migration to sovereign EU stack). Output: phased plan with explicit boundary.

  2. Weeks 3-10

    EU-facing workloads cutover

    EU traffic gradually shifted to the EU sovereign stack. Database replicas pre-staged. Storage sync. Edge migrations to Bunny.net.

  3. Weeks 10-14

    Decommission EU side of Aliyun

    Final cutover of EU workloads. Aliyun account scoped down to China-mainland-only workloads if those remain. EU customer DPAs updated to reflect new processor list.

Aliyun-to-EU cost comparison varies more than US migrations. For pure compute, EU sovereign stack is competitive or cheaper. For Aliyun-specific managed services (PolarDB at scale, Tablestore), the migration may not be cost-driven but compliance-driven. The strongest case is regulatory: GDPR penalties for inadequate Schrems II-style safeguards on PRC providers can dwarf any infrastructure cost difference.

常见问题

查看所有常见问题

What is the legal regime that makes Alibaba Cloud problematic for EU data?
Three primary instruments: the PRC Cybersecurity Law (2017) requires storage of certain data within China and grants government access; the Data Security Law (2021) extends data-handling obligations and allows extraterritorial application; Article 7 of the National Intelligence Law (2017) compels cooperation with state intelligence work. The combined effect is that PRC-controlled entities are required to provide access to data on government request. For GDPR purposes, this is a third-country transfer with high regulatory exposure.
But Alibaba Cloud International is registered in Singapore - does that change things?
Marginally. Alibaba Cloud Singapore is a subsidiary of Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Cayman Islands) which is operationally controlled from Hangzhou. The same parent jurisdiction analysis that affects US subsidiaries applies here, with the additional consideration that PRC laws have explicit extraterritorial provisions.
We need to serve customers in mainland China - how does that work?
A documented hybrid: Aliyun (or another PRC provider) for China-mainland-served traffic, EU sovereign stack for EU-served traffic, with a strict boundary on personal data. The boundary is documented in the DPA and reviewed quarterly. Many of our cross-border e-commerce clients run exactly this pattern.
Are there sovereign EU alternatives for the China-specific services?
For services that exist specifically because of China-side traffic patterns (PolarDB-X for cross-region active-active in PRC, Aliyun CDN for mainland delivery), there are no EU sovereign equivalents because the use case is China-specific. For everything else (compute, storage, basic managed databases), the EU sovereign stack covers it cleanly.
How long does an Alibaba Cloud exit take?
For typical EU-side workloads (compute, RDS, OSS, ACK): 8-14 weeks elapsed time. For mixed cross-border workloads where the China side stays: 6-10 weeks for the EU-side migration only. The hybrid model often takes longer to design than execute.
What about Huawei Cloud or Tencent Cloud?
Same legal analysis as Alibaba Cloud. All three are PRC-controlled entities subject to the same combination of Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and National Intelligence Law obligations. From a Schrems II perspective, the analysis is materially identical.

规划您的退出 Alibaba Cloud.

30 分钟范围确定通话。我们将您的技术栈映射到仅欧盟替代方案,估算迁移工作量,并告诉您这是否是正确的选择。

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